Overview and Background

One of the conclusions of the Liberia Reconstruction Conference (Donor’s Conference, 2004), was the creation of a government-led committee for the implementation and monitoring of the Results Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) as part of the necessary steps to ensure effective use of resources and to review the status of RFTF implementation and cooperation among donors and the government.

A two-track coordinating framework was put in place, consisting of; i) the RFTF Implementation and Monitoring Committee (RIMCO) which was to provide overall policy guidance and direction; and ii) nine (9) RFTF Working Committee (RWCs), providing technical level oversight over progress at cluster level and reporting to RIMCO, through the RIMCO Support Office (RSO). RIMCO’s guiding principles, included national ownership; accountability to all stakeholders; focus on results; flexibility in disbursements; and a single team approach.

Though the RFTF proved to be an innovative tool for post-crisis management and coordination and although there was noticeable progress in key RFTF result areas, there were also substantive gaps.  The debilitating factors were not only technical and financial but also organizational. Inadequate skills available in key administrative and management areas, insufficient and delayed releases of pledged funds, and widespread problems of coordination and accountability were particularly pronounced. The ever prevalent and openly held view of the NTGL’s inability to institute prudent and transparent mechanisms for managing public resources, and keeping to terms of good economic and political governance agreed to with donors and partners, presented real threats to the viability of the RFTF.  In short, the two-track coordinating framework was not very effective.

In designing the LRDC structure, special attention was paid to critical lessons learned from the implementation of the RFTF as mentioned above.  The LRDC structure provides the President with a means of enhancing 1) partner coordination; and 2) internal government management; i.e. a) to enhance coordination with external partners, thus assuring key senior officials and partners are consistently on the same development agenda; and b) to use the structure to monitor the implementation of the national reconstruction and development agenda through the cabinet and heads of autonomous agencies. In other words, together with the cabinet, the President should be able to set the goal, identify working resources, and together with the respective partner agencies, expect them to deliver and hold them accountable for results.